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The majority of existing research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) focuses primarily on its 
operation in past years. However, efforts to deepen an understanding of the BRI itself remain at 
an early stage. Some fundamental questions on its nature, scope, process and implications still 
remain and require clearer answers or even more debates. Scholars who fail to consider these 
larger questions risk developing their arguments on premature assumptions on the BRI and 
consequently overlooking very important elements of it. From the discipline of international 
relations (IR), this article aims to identify some key questions to the BRI and recommend a 
new research agenda. It argues that IR scholars face challenges to examine the BRI due to the 
BRI itself, as a puzzle, and limits of current dominant IR trends. This article suggests that a 
better understanding of the BRI involves a more open-minded conceptualization of it. The 
new research agenda on the BRI proposes to focus on five themes and related key questions 
and hypotheses. In order to tackle the complexity of the BRI, this agenda calls for more creative 
efforts, including a combination of various theoretical perspectives, and incorporation of 
more elements of non-western wisdom into analytical frameworks, including China and 
other countries. Being aware of the debates of incommensurability between paradigms and 
perspectives, this article suggests a pragmatic approach in acquiring knowledge on the BRI. 
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, international relations, research agenda.
Introduction
In 2013 Chinese President XI Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to 
the world. In past years, the BRI has attracted growing attention ranging from politicians 
to business elites, from China to its neighbors, from Asia to Europe and beyond. The 
BRI has become one buzzy word for observers, commentators and researchers in vari-
ous academic disciplines including social sciences1, engineering and even natural science 
within and outside China2 [1–3]. They have discussed the background and discourse of 
1 In July 2019, the author conducted search by retrieval of key words “Belt and Road” in the software 
of Endnote and found over 250  papers published during 2013–2019  in the Social Science Citation 
Index. The number of articles published each year are 10 in 2016, 32 in 2017, and about 100 in 2018 and 
2019 respectively. Thus, the majority of these articles were published after 2018, which reflects great increase 
in academic attention to the BRI after 2018. Besides, the names of these authors indicate that the majority of 
these authors are ethnically Chinese or at least heavily influenced by Chinese culture.
2 Leading international journals of science such as Nature and Science have published editorials and 
articles on the BRI. See recent texts, for instance, in references.
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the BRI, followed by various reports issued by many think tanks and other institutions on 
its implements, progresses and challenges, as well as potential impact and implications 
for China and those countries involved [4]. The existing academic literature on the BRI 
focuses primarily on the operation and implications of this initiative in past years [5; 6].
Yet the efforts to deepen understanding of it seemingly remain at an early stage. Some 
fundamental questions around the BRI — such as its nature, scope, process and implica-
tions for China and the whole world — still need richer answers or even more debates. For 
instance, we need to contemplate on such questions: from which perspectives and frame-
works could we examine the BRI and what are the differences between outcomes of these 
perspectives. Scholars who fail to consider these deeper questions of the BRI would risk of 
developing their arguments on the basis of some premature assumptions of it and accord-
ingly missing very important elements or even aspects of it. In fact, different scholars often 
tend to focus on different elements of it. While some Chinese stress the significance of the 
BRI in China’s current external relations, international observers may ask what exactly 
China wants and how will China change the world. Arguably, the BRI remains a puzzle 
requiring for further research and debates, including advances in conceptualization.
To advance this line of discussion, this article aims to identify some key questions to 
the studies of the BRI from the discipline of international relations (IR). It argues that the 
puzzle of the BRI can be viewed as a case of the broader puzzle of China’s approach to the 
world. Accordingly, to better examine the BRI means to better conceptualize and theorize 
China’s approach to the world, namely, its philosophy and practice of foreign policy. That 
is, we can better explore and understand a specific puzzle of the BRI by linking it to the 
broader one: China’s approach to the world. Using a metaphor, we can understand a tree 
in a forest mainly through two perspectives: focusing on the tree itself and locating it in 
the whole forest. This article suggests to combine the two perspectives to tackle the puz-
zle of the BRI and to advance broader research on China’s approach to the world. This 
article submits a new research agenda. It is not to present detailed answers to all of those 
fundamental questions or to offer a standard and comprehensive template for all future 
studies. Instead, it attempts to present some hints to some interesting and promising lines 
of thoughts to enrich future research. 
The BRI as a puzzle
The research themes of the BRI requires scholars to consider various dimensions 
of this initiative. Hypothetically, scholars can start from its background, main content, 
implementation and experience/lessons learned since 2013 to tackle more fundamental 
questions around the philosophical basis of Chinese foreign policy and divergent theoreti-
cal perspectives to frame it. 
The existing academic literature in English has covered some dimensions. Scholars 
have discussed on the nature, scope, implications of the BRI for the local, national (such 
as related countries), regional (related regions and continents such as Asia, Europe and 
Africa) and global. The first perspective is to link the BRI to China’s foreign policy [7], 
viewing it as China’s geopolitical plan or grand strategy [8–11]. Some have discussed its 
implications for countries, regions, and seas [12–15], including Asia [16], Europe [17; 
18] and Eurasia in general [19–21]. Issues of investment [22; 23], trade [24] and environ-
ment [25; 26] received much attention. The second perspective is to link the BRI to topics 
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2020. Т. 13. Вып. 1 35
at regional and international levels such as regionalism [27], international law [28], and 
international organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [29; 
30]. The third perspective is around global issues and global governance such as global 
finance [31; 32], global development [33], and global health [34]. The fourth perspective 
is more around other actors’ perceptions of the BRI [35], including Russia [36], and re-
sponses to China’s narratives on it [37; 38]. All of the discussions from above perspectives 
are interesting, inspiring and helpful for focusing on some important aspects and details 
of the BRI to deepen our understanding of it.
Meanwhile, there are also prior or more fundamental questions to the BRI which 
require more examination, reflections and debates. There are basic questions: what is the 
BRI, why is the BRI and how the BRI is realized? Arguably, the BRI remains a puzzle not 
only for policy commentators but also for academics. For many the BRI is associated with 
paradoxes, with which not only international observers are prone to be confused, but also 
Chinese scholars themselves. For instance, Wang Yiwei, one of leading Chinese scholars 
on the BRI, has listed a number of paradoxes for China on the BRI [39]. Indeed, the BRI 
has brought challenges in terms of what, why and how questions for the IR scholars to 
understand, explain and interpret it. For instance, there are debates on the motivation of 
China in the BRI. Why was the BRI proposed in 2013 and why it is different from other 
initiative, plans, strategies [40]? Some have realized the necessity of advancing the efforts 
to conceptualize and theorize the themes of the BRI [41–44]. 
Arguably, the challenges which the BRI has brought about to the IR research result 
both from the BRI itself and current dominant IR thoughts on which many researchers 
rely to analyze the world. In this article, the BRI as a puzzle has three meanings.
Firstly, one main feature of the BRI is fuzziness, vagueness and blurring. Although 
China has issued a series of official documents of the BRI3, up to date there is no one 
standard official definition which provide explicit and rich answers to basic questions of 
it: who, where, when, how, why and which. Specifically, who are to be involved in this 
initiative? Where does the BRI cover in the world? How much is the budget which China 
will set for it? How is it going on? How long will it exist? What are its phases of life cycle, 
which supposedly can include the beginning, revising, climax and ending? And why is it 
successful or unsuccessful, according to which criteria? 
Thus, it is possible that different observers have different interpretations of the BRI. 
For instance, many studies focus on the infrastructure projects. However, the BRI is not 
simply an infrastructure cooperation. Instead, China’s documents on the BRI reveal that 
it is featured by multi-sectoral and multi-level cooperation in five fields, including policy 
coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and 
closer people-to-people ties. In Chinese language, they are called 五通 (five connectivity). 
Another example is that some view the BRI as simply China’s unilateral strategy, plan or 
project. In fact, in proposing the BRI as an international initiative, China has explicitly 
pledged to uphold the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared 
benefits. Hypothetically, at least, the BRI is not merely China’s unilateral project.
Secondly, the above feature is closely related to the Chinese approach to proposing 
the BRI. Typically, Chinese officials firstly propose a new idea or concept which yet often 
has no explicit official definition to international audience, and then provide more details 
3 See those documents on the official website of the BRI: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn.
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of that idea later in response to the curiosity of the audience. That approach is in line 
with China’s approach in domestic reforms and opening-up, which involves policy ex-
periments in trail-and-error patterns, often starting with certain practice or idea followed 
by providing more details to interpret that practice or idea. Thus, although the BRI was 
proposed in 2013, more details appeared later in a variety of Chinese official documents 
[45; 46]. This approach also means changing and revision of details. That is, it is possible 
that connotation and denotation of the BRI are developing and expanding. For instance, 
regarding how many countries are to be under the BRI, at the beginning, it seems to be 
65 countries according to some sources. Later some guess that that the number should be 
over 65. A recent research report from Peiking University included 94 countries in their 
analysis of the BRI [47]. Up to date, many people are still guessing without clear answers. 
Another consequence is that the scope of the BRI is extending from original versions. For 
instance, in the infrastructure field, someone has already discussed extending the connec-
tivity from building roads, railways, bridges, ports, energy pipelines to cyber, digital level 
and outer space. Thus, the questions are where is the border of the BRI? Is the BRI equal 
to everything?
Although this approach of China can entail flexibility of the BRI which is brought by 
the vagueness, it sometimes also invites misunderstandings on the BRI. Since the BRI is 
the No. 1 project of China’s current external policy, it is also very attractive for Chinese do-
mestic actors, who are inclined to label their own activities/plans/projects as the part un-
der the BRI to seek support from Chinese Central Government. Chinese officials will also 
have bright prospective in their promotion because of their achievement in the BRI. In 
fact, there once were rushes of labelling various projects with the BRI and Chinese Central 
Government had to curb that rush by urging that all local projects within the framework 
of the BRI should be authenticated and authorized by the Central Government. 
Thirdly, the BRI depends on interactions between China and others. Since the BRI 
is not merely China’s unilateral strategy or plan, it relies on the responses of other actors. 
China is not able to solely decide the future of the BRI. It is China and others that jointly 
shape the BRI. As China claimed that the BRI is “originated in China, but it belongs to 
the world”, “focuses on Asia, Europe and Africa, but is open to all partners” [46]. The 
responses of others are various and changing. While some countries such as the United 
States of America (USA) is firmly opposed to it, it has received increasing support from 
many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The attitudes and responses of other 
countries to the BRI are likely to change due to their changing domestic situation such as 
forming new governments and changing international landscape as well. 
Challenges to the IR
The above three features of the BRI as a puzzle altogether require more conceptual, 
theoretical and even methodological discussions in the current IR discipline. However, 
the existing IR discipline, in which Western perspectives dominate research, is seemingly 
not sufficient for providing all satisfactory answers to the puzzle. Challenges or contradic-
tions lie in at minimum four aspects. 
The first is at the level of cultural difference between the West and China. The prevail-
ing Western IR thoughts are basically based on experience in the West, mainly Europe 
and the USA, providing observations, statements and reflections of the world from the 
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Western perspective. Typically, the Western IR literature often demands for distinction, 
concise and preciousness in using a concept such as power. Often the concepts are the 
beginning of logical reasoning in IR research. In contrast, as mentioned above, Chinese 
style of international cooperation is often characterized by fuzziness at the beginning as is 
reflected in the BRI. In fact, new ideas or concepts proposed by Chinese government are 
often lacking of explicit and detailed definitions at first and subject to subsequent more 
policy interpretations by Chinese scholars and/or think tanks [48; 49].
While lacking of clear definitions of the concepts such as the BRI enable China to 
adjust and revise some details of its proposals, this approach also leaves room for differ-
ent understanding and debates on those proposals among international observers and 
researchers. Thus, while it is important to examine some aspects and details of the BRI, it 
is equal or even more important to ponder deeply over and clarify the nature and scope 
of the initiative. Otherwise, if scholars do not think about these and clarify the common 
ground among them on the basic questions to the BRI before their going to conduct stud-
ies around some details of the BRI, then their discussions and debates would not have 
common basis and very likely end up with more confusions.
The second is that the existing English IR literature does not sufficiently examine 
China through Chinese perspective. While there are many citations of Western popular 
terminology such as grand strategy to label the BRI, there is little literature mentioning 
Chinese authentic discourse such as “a regional community of common destiny”. One 
possible reason for low citations of Chinese authentic discourse on the BRI and China’s 
foreign policy in general is that international authors are not familiar with Chinese termi-
nologies which are in Chinese language from Chinese governmental original discourse. 
Another reason is that Chinese discourse on the BRI emerged later than 2013 and has not 
received sufficient attention of international academics in the IR. Anyway, it is question-
able in methodology to analyze China without sufficient considering Chinese perspective. 
The third is on the BRI’s unfolding process of interactions and policy experimenta-
tion. In the current IR research, scholars often pursue certainty through seeking to reduce 
uncertainty. Yet as explained above, the BRI remains largely uncertain because of its un-
folding process shaped by various actors within and outside China. Since 2013 Chinese 
government has been waiting for and observing the response of others including states 
and non-state actors. In turn, those responses can have impact on China’s ideas on the 
BRI. One country’s responses on the BRI can also influence those of others. Thus, interac-
tions among various actors within and outside China at local, national, regional and glob-
al levels can be very complex and full of uncertainty. This uncertainty naturally associated 
with complexity inevitably demands more dynamic and sophisticated analytical frame-
works than current prevailing ones from realism, liberalism and constructivism in IR to 
better understand the BRI. This is not claim that the existing IR concepts and analytical 
frameworks are not useful, which might provide some valuable building blocks. Yet how 
to develop more powerful analytical frameworks on the basis of the existing ones to bet-
ter understand and explain the complex processes of the BRI remains a challenging task.
Finally, at methodological level, there is a gap between current IR approaches (such 
as deduction and induction) and pragmaticism in practice of the BRI. The prevailing IR 
research often stresses deduction: a research starts with a perspective, concept or ana-
lytical framework followed by collecting and analyzing the empirical data. However, as 
the BRI itself remains as a puzzle so far, it is difficult to avoid starting with an assumed 
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concept of the BRI, which is often premature and questionable in capturing the nature of 
it. For instance, scholars may simply assume the BRI as an infrastructure megaproject or 
grand strategy and then jump into some conclusions. Yet as discussed before, more care-
ful examination of the BRI can easily reveal that the BRI is not equal to infrastructure 
or geopolitical plan of China, because the BRI is not China’s unilateral plan. Instead, the 
BRI is more an international initiative which involves trail-and-error, learning by doing, 
and experiments. Thus, inductive research starting with observation and data collection 
without too early jumping into premature statements seems more helpful in analyzing 
the BRI. In addition, some IR scholars once suggested, pragmaticism is more suitable to 
analyze this kind of phenomenon such as trial-and-error processes [50–52]. Yet literature 
of pragmaticism remains little in the existing IR discipline. 
To conceptualize China’s approach to the world: A new research agenda
The BRI is one important initiative of China to the world. In a sense, the puzzle of the 
BRI is one case of puzzle of China’s approach to the world. Better understanding of the 
BRI needs better understanding of China’s approach to the world. We can only improve 
our research of the BRI through putting it in the broader and deeper research of China’s 
approach to the world. This article argues that to examine the BRI is one stream of efforts 
to conceptualize and theorize China’s approach to the world, including its the philosophy 
and practice of its foreign policy, and interactions with other players. 
This article suggests that better understanding of the BRI involves more open-mind-
ed conceptualization of it in IR research. This conceptualization needs firstly to tackle two 
issues: what is the nature and scope of the BRI, and how to build more powerful analytical 
frameworks for the BRI. Accordingly, this article submits a new research agenda which 
calls for more attention to five themes of the BRI. The first theme concerns the nature and 
scope of the BRI. The other four themes concern how to frame the BRI in the world. In 
particular, it recommends to incorporate more elements of non-western wisdom, in par-
ticular Chinese philosophy and thoughts into analytical frameworks. 
Theme one: The nature and scope of the BRI 
This theme requires answers to two sets of fundamental questions to conceptualize 
the BRI. One set is about the nature of the BRI: what is the nature of the BRI, in terms of 
rationale, legitimacy and value? Which perspectives are appropriate to frame the BRI? Is 
it a strategy or initiative as its name demonstrates? The other set is about the scope: what 
is the scope of the BRI, in terms of spatial, temporal, financial, social and environmental 
dimensions? How is the BRI implemented? What are the implications? 
To answer these questions, this article submits that the first step is to go back to the 
origins of the BRI, in particular the original official documents issued by Chinese govern-
ment4. Carefully reading through those documents can help avoid biases due to some 
researchers’ casual interpretation, hearsay, guesswork, or stereotypes of China’s proposals 
on the BRI. Another step is to carefully distinguish between initiative and other concepts 
such as grand strategy, plan and project. As these concepts entail different meanings, those 
4 Those documents are available on the official website of the BRI, some of which are in several 
languages.
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subtle differences should be clarified and identified. Although academics perhaps disagree 
with each other on how to define these concepts and how to set up criteria to distinguish 
them, these different concepts are hypothetically not interchangeable.
Regarding the nature of the BRI, one promising hypothesis is to capture the complex-
ity of it as an initiative which involves multi-sectoral, multi-level and multi-process phe-
nomena. Instead of viewing it as a simple initiative in a narrow sector of economy such as 
infrastructure or trade, this hypothesis stresses the multi-sectoral initiative which involves 
various governmental and non-governmental actors at levels from local to global. The 
interactions among those actors at the same level and different levels are complex, which 
involve multi-process of discussions, negotiations, consensus building, and even disputes 
resolving. That is, the interactions are definitely not one-way process from China to other 
countries. In those multi-process, various policy transfer, norms transfer, policy learning, 
trail-and-error, rule setting and revision can occur. Putting these three dimensions — sec-
tor, level and processes — together, the picture of the BRI is indeed very complex. There 
are many more questions to be answered on the interrelations and interplays between 
different sectors, between different levels, and between different processes. For instance, 
how trade or investment ties can affect people-to-people exchanges between two coun-
tries joining the BRI? How does the development of ties between local entities in different 
countries contribute to the building of “a global community of shared future” which is 
expected by China?
Another hypothesis is to be aware of the changing scope of the BRI, which can lie in 
spatial, temporal, and issue areas. It is important to note that connotation and denotation of 
the BRI are developing and expanding. For instance, as China claimed that the BRI is open 
to the world, the spatial scope of the cooperation within the BRI is extending. Since 2013 the 
numbers of countries which are interested in joining it through signing memorandum of 
understandings (MOUs) or cooperation agreements with China are on the rise. Meanwhile, 
the issue areas of cooperation around the BRI have already expanded from the original 五通 
(five connectivity) to more related fields such as scientific and technological innovation, ed-
ucation, health and medicine, ecological and environmental protection linked to the United 
Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In China’s recent documents, the BRI is 
expected to become a road of peace, prosperity, opening up, green development, innovation, 
connected civilizations, and clean government [46]. In order to better capture the complex-
ity and changing scope of the BRI, future research can consider more sophisticated analyti-
cal frameworks, research methods and technologies such as the big data tools5 [53; 54]. 
Theme two: The BRI as the output in China’s foreign relations
Here the output means that the BRI itself can be viewed and examined as an initiative 
and discourse. Firstly, along the line of initiative, future studies could concentrate on the 
background, intention, objectives, principles, methods and means of the BRI as an impor-
tant international initiative proposed by China. Discussions can be around questions such 
as why the BRI was proposed, why in 2013, what are the objectives, principles, methods 
and means of it? One direction is to link the BRI to China’s approach to the world. This 
involves discussing the cultural background of the BRI, which reflects certain ways of 
5 There are already some studies on using big data to examine the BRI. See some, for example, in 
references.
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thinking in Chinese foreign policy, in the context of Chinese traditions and philosophical 
basis of foreign policy which can date back, through the decades after 1978 and years after 
1949, to ancient China over 2000 years ago. 
For instance, regarding the principles and methods, there can be discussion on the 
style of the BRI and China’s international initiatives in general. Why was the BRI initiated 
without clear and more detailed definition and policy guidelines at the very beginning. 
One hypothesis is that this represents a Chinese style of foreign policy, which in turn is 
closely associated with domestic practice. In particular, one main experience in contem-
porary China is to conduct reforms through policy experiments, or more popular saying 
in Chinese:摸着石头过河 (crossing the river by feeling for stones), which “calls for pru-
dence in feeling our way forward in unfamiliar territory, and testing the waters before a 
major course of action aiming at achieving breakthroughs is launched”, and “encourages 
innovation, exploration, and trailblazing efforts, while at the same time emphasizing the 
importance of identifying and promoting best practices on the basis of lessons learned” 
[55]. Namely, it basically means trial-and-error. 
Along this line of discussion, we can ask more questions. Is it possible to summarize 
China’s approach to the world? Whether the BRI as a case represents a general style of 
Chinese approach to international initiatives as a mode: to firstly propose a rough idea and 
see what will happen and have more trail-and-error processes? To what extent does China 
follow this mode in proposing its own ideas or concepts to the world, such as “contribut-
ing Chinee wisdom (中国智慧)” and “Chinese contribution (中国贡献) to global govern-
ance”? It seems that up to date no one has explicitly defined what is Chinese wisdom or 
what are the specific content of it.
Secondly, along the line of discourse, the BRI is widely recognized as one impor-
tant component of China’s foreign policy and proposals on international relations. In past 
years, Chinese leaders have proposed a series of new concepts on international relations 
and world affairs, such as “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics （中国
特色大国外交)”, and “building a global community of shared future (构建人类命运共
同体)”. The BRI is viewed as an important platform for realizing the “global community of 
shared future” [46]. What are the relations between the BRI and other concepts on China’s 
diplomacy proposed by current Chinese leadership? How to locate the ideas of the BRI to 
broader discourse on foreign policy dating back to earlier years of the People’s Republic of 
China since 1949? Some comparison between the discourse of the BRI and that of China’s 
other international initiatives in past decades can help reveal the changing patterns of 
discourse in China’s foreign policy and related domestic policy on economic and social 
development. 
Theme three: The BRI as processes since 2013
The BRI is not a one-shot initiative which can be immediately accomplished. Instead, 
it has existed since 2013, and will last as China’s flagship international initiative in the fore-
seeable future. Thus, it makes sense to note the temporal dimension of this initiative which 
entails processes at several levels. Firstly, at unilateral level, there is a process of policy 
development originally from China. As discussed above, China initiated an idea firstly 
to its Asian partners, waited for the response of the audience, and gradually developed 
more details of the BRI. There are domestic processes within China, from desk works of 
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drafting documents to setting up institutions at national level to promote and implement 
the details. Secondly, there are also international processes through various bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms. At the bilateral level, China invited other countries and interna-
tional organizations to cooperate on the BRI, through signing the MOUs and agreements 
and launching key concrete projects. At multilateral level, in order to reach consensus on 
the BRI, China offered invitations to all countries and international organizations in the 
world to have dialogues, including the Belt and Road Forums for International Coopera-
tion held in Beijing in 2017 and 2019. Thirdly, the implementation of the BRI actually 
involves various actors at local, national, regional and global levels, who are involved in 
complex interactions within and trans various levels. 
Hypothetically, the task to examine the BRI as processes involves two aspects of one 
thing: temporal (the life cycle of the BRI) and spatial (interactions within and cross levels). 
The study of the BRI’s life cycle mainly addresses questions such as what are the stages 
of the BRI, how does it move from one stage to another, what are important factors in-
fluencing the life cycle. This line of study concerns stages such as planning, scheduling, 
joining, networking, implementation, problems emerging and resolving, plan adjustment, 
and projects finishing. The study of interactions asks questions such as what are the inter-
actions involved within and cross levels, which types are they, why do they exist, whether 
and how do they interrelate and interact with each other. The research on interactions 
can concern consensus building (for example, through dialogues, persuasion and coop-
eration), rule setting ( for example, through negotiations, bargaining and coordination), 
opposing, competition, compromising, secession, disputes resolving, and international 
diffusion of norms, standards and best practices. There are some analytical frameworks in 
the IR to be used to discuss the processes of the BRI. For instance, from the perspective of 
rational choice institutionalism, some viewed the BRI as a ‘geo-functional institutionalist’ 
project, which is feasible for China to promote in a functionalist way in a world dominated 
by the west [56].
Another important subtopic is on various actors’ perceptions of and attitudes to the 
BRI. In particular, it is important to examine how other states and peoples outside China 
perceive the BRI and what their responses are. While the BRI is embraced by some coun-
tries, it also faces obstacles and a “counter push” from other players to prevent China’s 
rise and increasing influence in the world [57]. Why are some states more supportive on 
it than others? Whether and how do states and non-state actors change their perceptions 
on the BRI? Have they been disappointed or not up to date? What are important factors 
of the changes?
Theme four: The BRI as an input to the world
The impact and implications of the BRI can be examined at three circles: China itself, 
countries involved, and the world in general. This needs to be scrutinized further. Firstly, 
it is to be researched what the impact of the BRI on China itself is, including domestic 
economic, social and regional situation. To what extent is the BRI in line with China’s 
domestic development and and external relations in general? Secondly, the impact of the 
BRI on other countries and regions involved such as Asia, Europe and Africa, is worth full 
discussing. To what extent does the BRI contribute to the development of, and the integra-
tion in, East Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia and broader regions? Thirdly, at global level, it is to 
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examine the implications of the BRI for international relations, including geoeconomics, 
geopolitics, global governance, and international order. At all of these circles, it is to be 
asked what the impact and implications of the BRI are, whether they are negative or posi-
tive, what the criteria is to judge and how to judge. 
There are possible hypotheses. One is to focus on the ideational aspect — the dis-
course dimension of the BRI, which provides a perspective/framework to reorganize vari-
ous ties or connections within and outside China. For instance, domestic actors in China 
support enhancing ties including trade, investment and development elements with their 
foreign counterparts. Similarly, the BRI can also serve as a framework for other countries 
to identify connections and related opportunities through which to boost their own de-
velopment. In this sense, the BRI can been seen as a strategic narrative of China to shape 
how others perceive the world6 [58]. Yet, it is to be studied to what extent it reshaped the 
discourse of others about China, Eurasia, and the whole world. How did that happen? To 
what extent do other states and non-state actors accept China’s strategic narrative on the 
BRI?
Another hypothesis is to focus on the material aspect of the impact of the BRI as 
an international project. This involves the examination of three related issues: 1) the ef-
fect on specific issue areas such as connectivity, investment and environment in target 
local, national and regional contexts, 2) general effect of issue areas linked together on 
Asia, Europe, Africa and broader regions, 3) broader implications for international order 
and global governance. Regarding the impact on specific issue areas, there are already de-
bates such as the so-called  “debt trap” [59–62]. Future research can advance discussions 
on problems already emerged, potential problems and risks with it, as well as resolving 
mechanisms and solutions needed. It is also important to discuss the impact of the BRI on 
global governance in dealing with common challenges to humankind. 
In particular, the BRI’s implication for international order is one important topic. 
There are debates on the end of the existing order dominated by the West and a new order. 
One influential view is that a new order is likely a thin and two thick bounded orders — 
one led by China and the other by the USA [63]. Another view believes that “a more likely 
alternative is a world with little order — a world of deeper disarray” [64, p. 30]. Future re-
search should answer to what extent the BRI will influence this process. Anyway, the more 
objective research the better. The implications of the BRI should not be overestimated or 
underestimated. 
Theme five: The comparative research on the BRI 
Comparison can help generate more insights of the BRI through putting it to various 
contexts. One direction is to compare the progresses in each of five connectivity, to access 
in which issue areas the BRI is more successful. Another direction is to focus on one issue 
area such as connectivity to compare the BRI and plans proposed by others such as the 
strategy of the European Union (EU) for connecting Europe and Asia [65], to reveal the 
similarities and differences between them. To what extent do these plans represent dif-
ferent approaches or models in international connectivity? Researchers can also discuss 
6 Strategic narrative is defined as ‘a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the 
past, present and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors’. 
See [58].
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the prospect of the synthesis or competition of these plans. From broader perspective of 
international relations, future research can also concern the difference between the BRI 
and other great initiatives and programs in the past and present such as the Marshall Plan, 
also known as the European Recovery Program, proposed by the USA after the World 
War Two. Why, and how, are they different? There are already some articles on such com-
parison [66]. Yet further discussions can go to more fundamental layers such as the philo-
sophical basis of foreign policy of China, the USA, the EU, Germany after 1945, Japan, 
India, and so on.
Research challenges ahead
The above five themes of the BRI require deeper research on it, which in turn re-
quires theoretical and methodological innovations to tackle challenges ahead. At theoreti-
cal level, challenges are around at minimum on two debates. The first is about theoretical 
monism and pluralism. Often IR scholars tend to adopt a single theoretical perspective 
and conduct a deep analysis on certain aspects of the phenomenon of interest. In con-
trast to this theoretical monism, authors endorsing pluralism suggest to combine different 
perspectives and paradigms to concern the whole story. This division reflects the deeper 
division between reductionism and holism at methodological level. Some IR scholars 
have suggested that researcher need to move from “paradigm wars” to “analytical eclecti-
cism” [67]. For better understanding of the BRI which is very complex, this article sug-
gests to pay more attention to theoretical pluralism, which leaves more room for efforts to 
trying various combinations of theoretical perspectives and paradigms. 
The second is about incorporating more elements of non-western wisdom, including 
that of China and other countries alongside the BRI. The world is so diverse. It is obviously 
that not every non-western country follows western way of thinking. As the BRI is joined 
by many non-western countries, it is important to analyze the international relations in 
these regions in their own cultures and perspectives. That is to study and understand non-
western nations in non-western ways. For instance, many original ideas and concepts from 
Chinese official discourse on the BRI deserve more academic attention such as principles 
of building the BRI which were mentioned in official documents on the BRI, as well as the 
patterns, mode and styles of China’s practice in pushing forward the BRI. The philosophy 
and practice of China’s foreign policy are worth better theorizing by focusing on the cases 
of the BRI. Some questions require richer answers. For instance, what is the relationship 
between the BRI and  “the new type of international relations”, and  “building a commu-
nity with a shared future for humankind”, which are two key concepts China proposed to 
the world. Besides, comparative research is also needed to identify the common ground 
and differences between Chinese philosophy and practice of foreign policy and those of 
other countries. Similarly, the cultural and philosophical ideas of foreign policy of Russia, 
India and other countries should also be incorporated into the analytical frameworks.
Nevertheless, some scholars would raise the questions of incommensurability be-
tween paradigms. This is related to lasting debates at methodological level. Besides con-
ventional approaches in the IR theorizing such as induction and deduction, some scholars 
argue that pragmaticism is also needed [51]. Here pragmaticism stresses abduction: the 
process of generating and choosing models, hypotheses and data analyzed in response to 
surprising findings. To avoid epistemological deadlock of mistakenly seeking “warranted 
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knowledge through traditional scientific methods”, a pragmatic approach is promising in 
combining knowledge generation and leaving more room for innovation [68]. It is true 
that these above debates at theoretical and methodological levels remain going on. Nev-
ertheless, there is arguably never such warranted knowledge in the IR which is absolute 
correct without any more debates or tests. Thus, we cannot simply wait for the end of all 
theoretical and methodological debates to be sure that our coming knowledge production 
can be based on the conclusions of those debates which are unquestionable anymore. To 
advance the research on the BRI, we should at least be open-minded to explore various 
opportunities of accumulating knowledge which yet certainly to be repeatedly verified in 
the future.
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